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There	May	be	trouble	ahead:	post-EU	referendum
instability	will	keep	afflicting	the	UK
In	advance	of	the	election,	Theresa	May	claimed	that	a	resounding	victory	would	enhance	her
bargaining	position	in	the	coming	negotiations	with	the	EU.	Andrew	Blick	(King’s	College	London
and	the	Federal	Trust)	has	long	argued	that	the	size	of	the	UK		government	majority	would	not	be	a
preeminent	concern	for	the	EU,	and	would	not	in	itself	lead	to	their	countenancing	compromising
fundamental	material	objectives.	The	early	election	was	intended	by	May	to	service	the
requirements	of	domestic	political	management.	He	maintains	that	this	remains	problematic	for	the
Brexit	negotiations.
May	sought	to	strengthen	her	personal	authority	and	that	of	her	government	within	Parliament	and	beyond.	She
hoped	to	discourage	resistance	from	the	House	of	Lords	and	delegitimise	any	complaints	from	the	devolved
territories	and	any	political	opponents	of	Brexit.	She	hoped	to	obtain	a	mandate	not	only	for	Brexit	but	for	Brexit	of
a	particular	variety	–	entailing	clear	departure	from	the	Single	Market	and	Customs	Union	–	while	reserving	for
herself	the	discretion	to	finesse	the	precise	way	in	which	these	outcomes	were	attained.	Crucially,	May	sought	to
insulate	herself	against	rebellion	from	within	her	own	party.	It	might	come	from	a	variety	of	wings	according	to	the
particular	course	of	developments.	On	past	evidence,	however,	it	was	those	who	were	particularly	hostile	to	the
EU	who	were	most	likely	to	create	concerted	difficulties	for	May,	if	they	felt	that	a	supposed	obligation	to	attain	a
firm	break	from	EU	membership	was	not	properly	being	implemented.
The	attainment	of	all	these	political	benefits	was	predicated	on	May	securing	a	substantial	increase	–	possibly
reaching	three	figures	–	in	the	Commons	majority	she	inherited	from	her	predecessor	as	Conservative	Prime
Minister,	David	Cameron.	When	she	sought	the	early	dissolution,	opinion	research	suggested	such	an	outcome
was	likely,	and	the	Labour	Party	appeared	to	be	a	likely	weak	opponent.	However,	in	the	event,	May	lost	her
majority	in	the	Commons	and	is	now	dependent	upon	the	Democratic	Unionist	Party	(DUP)	to	retain	its
confidence.	The	decision	to	call	the	election	was	May’s	own.	She	did	not	consult	with	Cabinet.	The	precise
nature,	extent	and	durability	of	the	political	benefits	that	could	have	accrued	to	May	had	she	secured	a	substantial
victory	are	necessarily	matters	of	speculation.	That	her	failure	to	do	so	has	inflicted	serious	damage	upon	her	–
along	with	her	government	and	party	–	is	not.	The	loss	of	a	Commons	majority	is	a	clearly	measurable	problem.
Less	tangible	but	beyond	doubt	is	the	loss	of	credibility	May	has	endured.	Her	decision	to	bring	about	the	early
election,	the	nature	of	the	policy	programme	she	constructed	and	the	nature	of	the	campaign	she	conducted	–
which,	importantly,	focused	on	her	personal	leadership	–	all	reflect	poorly	on	the	Prime	Minister.	But	what
precisely	this	serious	and	self-inflicted	political	wound	means	for	the	European	issue,	which	was	the	major	motive
for	her	error,	requires	closer	examination.
May’s	standing	within	Cabinet	is	diminished
A	first	observation	is	that	May’s	standing	within	Cabinet	is	diminished.	Her	political	capital	is	reduced	and	her
domineering	style	has	been	seen	to	fail.	Cabinet	members	will	feel	more	able	to	assert	themselves	than	they
would	in	different	circumstances	–	and	might	see	a	need	to	do	so	in	the	difficult	circumstances	that	face	them.	In
advance	of	the	election	there	was	speculation	–	whether	fed	by	her	team	or	not	–	that	she	intended	to	bring	about
a	more	substantial	reshuffle	than	ultimately	she	felt	able	to	do.	Consequently,	some	senior	members	of	her
Cabinet,	who	were	on	either	side	of	the	referendum,	might	feel	that	they	only	remain	in	their	posts	because	of
May’s	failure	to	secure	a	better	result.	A	complication	here	from	the	EU	perspective	is	that	pressure	on	May	can
come	from	more	than	one	direction.	Philip	Hammond,	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	now	seems	more	able	to
promote	the	idea	of	a	Brexit	that	maximises	continuity,	with	a	significant	transitional	component.	Yet	it	is	equally
likely	that	others	in	the	Cabinet	will	feel	less	restrained	than	they	might	otherwise	do	in	forcing	her	towards	a
more	radical	path	of	departure.	A	further	problem	May	faces	with	her	Cabinet	is	that	if	and	when	there	is	an	effort
to	force	her	removal	from	office,	participants	in	it	–	and	possibly	her	successor	as	Prime	Minister	–	will	come	from
within	it.
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Similar	considerations	apply	to	the	Conservative	parliamentary	party	as	a	whole.	The	existence	of	a	substantial
group	firmly	committed	to	departure	and	suspicious	of	compromises	in	negotiations	with	the	EU	will	persist	as
before.	It	is	plausible	that	this	wing	could	at	some	point	be	a	source	of	demands	that	the	UK	opt	for	‘no	deal’,	on
the	grounds	that	the	exit	terms	on	which	the	EU	is	insisting	are	unacceptable.	Such	a	campaign	is	likely	to	find
supporters	within	Cabinet	itself.	Yet	in	the	new	parliamentary	environment,	other	Conservative	MPs	who	are	less
hostile	towards	the	EU	might	also	see	an	opportunity	to	assert	themselves.	They	could	seek	to	take	advantage	of
a	weakened	leadership	and	might	regard	the	election	result	as	calling	into	question	the	EU	policy	advocated	by
May.	The	prospect	of	a	parliamentary	rebellion	is	a	problem	for	any	government,	especially	when	the	party
holding	office	lacks	a	majority	of	its	own	in	the	Commons.	An	actual	defeat	is	more	serious	still.	It	seems	likely
that	a	revolt	by	Conservatives	less	hostile	to	the	EU,	if	it	occurred,	would	connect	with	others	in	the	Commons
and	perhaps	thereby	attain	a	majority,	an	option	probably	not	open	to	Eurosceptic	Conservatives	defying	their
party’s	whip.
This	observation	leads	to	consideration	of	the	wider	parliamentary	position.	The	Conservative	government	now
lacks	a	majority	in	each	House.	One	of	May’s	apparent	motives	for	the	General	Election	was	to	be	able	to	claim	a
democratic	mandate.	She	seemed	to	hope	she	could	extend	the	compliance	over	Brexit	she	had	so	far	enjoyed	in
the	Commons	to	the	Lords.	Instead,	she	has	expanded	uncertainty	from	the	Lords	to	the	Commons.	In	both	the
Commons	and	the	Lords	supporters	of	‘leave’	in	June	2016	seemingly	comprised	only	minorities.	Yet	the
supporters	of	“remain”	have	so	far	largely	felt	obliged	to	appear	to	abide	by	the	referendum	result	(with	slightly
more	resistance	to	the	particulars	coming	from	the	Lords).	Perhaps	this	position	could	change.
The	idea	that	elections	(or	indeed	referendums)	can	imbue	proposals	such	as	those	contained	in	manifestos	with
a	special	status	overriding	the	more	regular	principles	of	representative	democracy	is	always	deserving	of
scepticism.	But	since	no	party	won	the	election	outright,	this	doctrine	of	the	mandate	becomes	unsustainable,
even	within	the	terms	of	those	who	adhere	to	it.	May	has	already	dropped	prominent	elements	from	her
manifesto:	is	there	any	reason,	from	this	point	of	view,	that	the	version	of	Brexit	she	advocates,	or	indeed	leaving
the	EU	at	all,	could	not	follow	them?	A	counter	argument	here	involves	the	Labour	Party.	Following	the
referendum,	the	Leader	of	the	Opposition,	Jeremy	Corbyn,	who	did	not	campaign	for	the	‘remain’	side	with	the
same	enthusiasm	he	displayed	during	the	2017	General	Election,	accepted	Brexit	as	a	fait	accompli.
Consequently	both	the	main	parties	contested	the	recent	parliamentary	election	on	the	same	basic	premise,	that
leaving	was	a	foregone	conclusion.	Supporters	of	Brexit	have	therefore	noted	that	parties	committed	to	UK
departure	from	the	EU	received	the	overwhelming	majority	of	votes	casts	and	seats	won	(the	Liberal	Democrats
were	the	party	most	clearly	committed	to	a	revision	of	the	policy).
parties	committed	to	the	UK’s	departure	from	the	EU	received	the	overwhelming
majority	of	votes
Their	point	cannot	be	ignored.	But	we	should	not	necessarily	conflate	a	vote	for	a	party	with	support	for	the
entirety	of	its	manifesto,	or	a	given	component	of	it.	(Indeed,	some	patterns,	especially	in	London	and	the	South
East,	should	properly	be	construed	as	suggestive	of	tactical	voting	against	the	Conservative	Party	over	the	EU
issue.)	The	idea	of	some	kind	of	composite	mandate	based	on	an	arbitrary	comparison	of	election	programmes
has	no	clear	place	in	established	constitutional	thought	in	the	UK.	There	are	problems	inherent	in	the	proposition
that	a	party	of	government	can	supplement	insufficient	levels	of	authority	from	the	programme	of	an	opposition
party	which	it	fought	at	a	recent	election.	No	Conservative	was	claiming	in	advance	of	the	election	that	those	who
supported	Brexit	might	just	as	well	vote	Labour	as	Conservative.	They	preferred	instead	to	stress	the	idea	that
only	May	could	be	trusted	to	deliver	the	best	outcome	for	the	UK.	As	with	some	of	the	interpretations	that	have
been	placed	on	the	EU	referendum	result,	there	is	necessarily	selective	retrospective	inference	at	work.
Furthermore,	those	who	see	in	the	General	Election	a	definitive	popular	endorsement	of	departure	from	the	EU
are	firm	in	their	rejection	of	the	idea	of	a	further	referendum	–	suggesting	that	their	confidence	in	public	opinion	is
not	as	great	as	they	might	claim.	Moreover,	even	if	the	General	Election	could	be	held	to	have	produced	some
kind	of	enhanced	Brexit	mandate,	for	how	long	does	it	apply?	Labour	is	not	subject	to	the	same	expectation	as
the	Conservatives	that	it	needs	to	maintain	the	policy	stance	on	which	it	contested	the	election,	since	it	did	not
form	a	government.	It	is	entirely	acceptable	for	the	opposition	to	review	its	approach	–	indeed	to	do	otherwise
would	seem	peculiar.
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Whatever	the	position	taken	by	Labour	and	other	opposition	parties	at	the	General	Election	and	afterwards,	it	is
the	Conservatives	who	hold	office.	It	is	they	who	now	have	to	govern	on	a	basis	of	diminished	formal	and
practical	authority	and	with	a	questionable	mandate.	In	the	Lords,	they	may	assert	that	the	so-called	‘Salisbury
Addison’	principle	still	applies	to	their	legislative	programme.	But	decisions	that	members	of	the	second	chamber
make	about	the	extent	to	which	they	should	assert	themselves	always	contain	a	political	component.	They	will
now	feel	more	able	to	resist	than	they	would	if	faced	with	an	enlarged	Conservative	majority	in	the	Commons.
Anti-DUP	Protest	at
Downing	Street	(2017),	licenced	under	Creative	Commons	CC0	1.0	Universal	Public	Domain	Dedication
One	party	other	than	the	Conservatives	that	will	have	a	direct	impact	upon	government	is	the	DUP.	Its	approach
to	the	EU	issue	exemplifies	almost	to	the	point	of	caricature	some	of	the	tensions	in	the	Brexit	agenda	and	the
difficulties	that	the	Conservative	government	is	likely	to	face	in	pursuit	of	its	present	policy.	The	DUP	was	among
the	most	enthusiastic	advocates	of	a	‘leave’	vote;	yet	is	also	as	hostile	as	any	regarding	the	consequences	of	the
course	of	action	it	supports.	It	demands	departure	from	the	EU,	yet	also	that	there	should	be	no	negative	impact
for	the	part	of	the	UK	that	has	a	land	border	with	it.	How	this	attitude	will	manifest	itself	as	negotiations	unfold
remains	to	be	seen,	but	parliamentary	arithmetic	means	that	the	position	of	the	DUP	now	has	a	magnified
importance	out	of	proportion	to	the	strength	of	the	party	in	the	House	of	Commons	and	irrespective	of	the
rationality	or	otherwise	of	its	stance.	In	fact,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	idea	of	a	minority	group	imposing	its	will	is
a	familiar	one	to	observers	of	the	rise	of	Euroscepticism	within	the	Conservative	Party.	It	is	only	the	extent	of	the
discrepancy	between	size	and	influence,	rather	than	the	basic	proposition,	that	enhances	the	absurdity.
political	speculation	centres	around	the	question	of	how	long	May	can	continue
as	Prime	Minister
At	present	political	speculation	in	the	UK	centres	around	the	question	of	how	long	May	can	continue	as	Prime
Minister.	Certainly,	it	seems	implausible	that	she	will	be	allowed	–	or	wish	–	to	lead	the	party	into	another	General
Election.	But	the	party	will	at	present	wish	to	avoid	another	poll,	which	it	will	genuinely	fear	that	Labour	could	win.
Moreover,	the	proposition	of	removing	May	is	problematic.	There	is	as	yet	no	obvious	successor	and	not	even
much	evidence	of	a	credible	candidate	who	wishes	to	take	on	the	role.	A	contest,	if	it	occurred,	would	be	difficult
to	manage	in	conjunction	with	a	minority	government	and	ongoing	Brexit	negotiations,	particularly	if	it	called	into
doubt	what	might	be	the	stance	towards	the	EU	of	the	new	Prime	Minister.	One	calculation	could	be	that	it	is
better	to	let	May	oversee	Brexit	and	then	depart.	She	could	retain	the	premiership	until	this	point	entirely	by
default.
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But	to	assume	this	scenario	is	possible	could	well	be	to	underestimate	the	disruptive	force	of	the	European
question	within	the	Conservative	Party	and	UK	politics.	It	is,	after	all,	the	main	reason	for	the	present	turbulence
and	instability.	To	expect	more	upheaval	is	reasonable.	It	is	beginning	to	become	manifest	that	the	bargaining
position	of	the	UK	with	respect	to	the	EU	is	not	as	great	as	some	Brexit	enthusiasts	believed	or	suggested	it
might	be.	For	instance,	any	idea	that	work	on	a	Free	Trade	Agreement	could	be	commenced	in	parallel	with	exit
negotiations	and	discussion	of	citizenship	has	now	been	dispelled.	From	the	Eurosceptic	perspective,	the	‘bad
deal’	to	which	‘no	deal’	is	supposedly	preferable	may	be	coming	on	to	the	agenda.	Those	who	share	this
disposition	could	come	to	insist	that	the	UK	withdraw	from	negotiations,	particularly	when	issues	such	as
compensation	payments	for	leaving	and	transitional	periods	become	prominent.	At	this	point	a	concerted	effort	to
remove	May	could	begin.	If	a	leadership	contest	were	to	occur,	others	who	were	less	hostile	to	the	EU	could
consider	entry	on	this	platform.	Or	if	May	capitulated	to	pressure	and	opted	for	‘no	deal’,	it	might	be	the	time	to
challenge	her.	If	any	one	of	these	scenarios	came	about,	it	would	be	plain	that,	in	holding	a	referendum	on	EU
membership,	David	Cameron	did	not	manage	to	prevent	a	more	serious	conflict	in	the	Conservative	Party,	but
ultimately	only	postponed	it,	and	possibly	made	it	more	pronounced	when	it	did	occur.
Because	of	the	General	Election	that	has	precipitated	the	latest	variant	in	the	post-EU	referendum	instability
afflicting	the	UK,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	parliamentary	role	of	parties	other	than	the	Conservatives.	It
seems	unlikely	at	present	that	the	DUP	will	see	any	advantage	in	triggering	another	General	Election	or
supporting	another	government	than	the	current	minority	administration.	An	administration	that	did	not	include
Conservative	MPs	in	its	base	of	support	would,	in	any	case,	be	exceptionally	fragile.	However,	if	a	‘no	deal’	Brexit
became	likely,	or	if	public	opinion	visibly	turned	against	the	Brexit	enterprise	either	because	of	this	threat,	or	a
growing	perception	that	a	moderated	form	of	Brexit	is	a	pointless	exercise,	the	time	might	become	ripe	for	a
majority	in	the	Commons,	comprising	both	Conservative	and	Labour	MPs,	to	consider	its	position.	It	might	be	that
a	change	of	policy	is	not	attainable	within	existing	party	structures;	and	aside	from	the	problems	with	May,	the
presence	of	Corbyn	in	the	Labour	leadership	could	be	an	obstacle	both	to	a	change	of	approach	over	Europe	and
to	cross-party	collaboration.	It	will	fall	to	the	judgement	of	those	concerned	to	determine	whether	circumstances
call	for	a	reconfiguration	of	the	British	party	landscape,	whether	of	a	temporary	or	more	lasting	nature.	But	a
majority	in	the	Commons	can	achieve	much,	and	can	certainly	override	the	minority	with	which	May’s
miscalculation	has	left	her.
An	earlier	version	of	this	post	appeared	on	The	Federal	Trust	and	it	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not
those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Dr	Andrew	Blick	is	Lecturer	in	Politics	and	Contemporary	History,	King’s	College	London;	and	Senior	Research
Fellow	at	the	Federal	Trust.
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